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U.S. Demand for Source–Differentiated
Shrimp: A Differential Approach
Keithly Jones, David J. Harvey, William Hahn, and
Andrew Muhammad
Estimates of price and scale elasticities for U.S. consumed shrimp are derived using
aggregate shrimp data differentiated by source country. Own-price elasticities for all
countries had the expected negative signs, were statistically significant, and inelastic. The
scale elasticities for all countries were positive and statistically significant at the 1% level
with only the United States and Ecuador having scale elasticities of less than one. For the
most part, the compensated demand effects showed that most of the cross-price effects were
positive. Our results also suggest that despite the countervailing duties imposed by the
United States, shrimp demand was fairly stable.
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This article addresses U.S. demand for source-
differentiated shrimp. There is a large body of
literature on demand for different seafood
species (Asche 1996; Asche, Salvanes, and
Steen; Burton; Eales, Durham, and Wessells;
Keithly and Diagne; Park, Thurman, and
Easley). There is also a large body of literature
on trade policy and conflicts in the seafood
market (Asche 1996, 1997, 2001; Asche,
Bremnes, and Wessells; Kinnucan; Kinnucan
and Myrland 2002, 2006). However, the lack
of studies on an important species like shrimp
is an odd exception, since, according to the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (NOAA), shrimp accounted for more
than a quarter of the United States per capita
seafood consumption in 2005.
For the last decade (1996–2005), U.S.
shrimp imports have increased nearly 11%
per year on average and have gained a greater
share of total U.S. supply. At the same time,
shrimp prices saw a more than 75% decline
(see Figure 1). In 1996, domestic shrimp
production and shrimp imports were 21%
and 79% of total U.S. supply, respectively.
Currently, imports account for over 90% of
total U.S. shrimp supply (NOAA). In addition
to significantly increasing, U.S. shrimp im-
ports have become more concentrated in a few
supplying countries. In 2004, six shrimp
exporting countries supplied more than 70%
of total U.S. imports, which were in excess of
1 billion pounds. These countries included:
Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and
Vietnam. Other major exporters of shrimp to
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In response to the increase in shrimp
imports and falling shrimp prices, the U.S.
shrimp industry filed petitions requesting that
the U.S. International Trade Commission
(USITC) and the U.S. Department of Com-
merce (USDOC) investigate whether shrimp
imports were being sold to the United States
below fair market value, and to also determine
if exporters were receiving government sup-
port deemed injurious to the U.S. shrimp
industry. In 2005, the USITC unanimously
found that the U.S. shrimp industry had been
injured by illegal dumping on the part of the
aforementioned exporters (Brazil, Ecuador,
India, Thailand, Vietnam, and China) and
that a countervailing duty could be imposed
on specific warm water shrimp imports from
the six countries (Long; Zwaniecki).
The question then is would the counter-
vailing duties imposed by the United States
have any significant impact on shrimp import
demand? Thomas and Ulubasoglu found that
trade policies resulted in structural breaks in
import demand for some commodities due to
the change in access to substitutes. Mwega
also found that trade policies that are designed
to increase export earnings are more likely to
have a large impact on import volumes.
In this study, we estimate U.S. demand for
domestic and imported shrimp differentiated
by exporting country using a Netherlands
Central Bureau Statistic (CBS) demand system
model. Parameter estimates are used to obtain
elasticities of demand. We also explore the
stability of shrimp demand in light of the
countervailing duties imposed on some im-
ported shrimp. Specific objectives are the
following: (1) to econometrically estimate
U.S. demand for shrimp (domestic and
imported) where imports are differentiated
by country of origin; (2) to estimate demand
elasticities from the estimated demand param-
eters; (3) to test for monthly seasonality and
stability of demand from each country.
Background
In 2005 total U.S. landings of commercial
shrimp were 261.1 million pounds and valued
at $406.5 million. This was equivalent to
162.4 million pounds on a head-off weight
basis. The Gulf States accounted for 88% of
total landings that year while the South
Atlantic and Pacific accounted for 7.4% and
Figure 1. U.S. Shrimp Imports, 1995–2006
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was 16% lower when compared to 2003. Since
2000, shrimp production had decreased 26%.
During the last decade (1996–2005), U.S.
commercial landings of shrimp (head-off
basis) have averaged 190 million pounds.
Above-average years included 2000 and
2001, where commercial landings were 218.5
and 201.0 million pounds, and below-average
years included 1997 and 1998, where commer-
cial landings were 179.0 and 173.3 million
pounds, respectively. The year 2005 marked a
record low for the decade. While U.S. shrimp
production has declined by 56 million pounds
since 2000, U.S. shrimp imports have in-
creased to 467 million pounds. From 1996 to
2005, shrimp imports grew 107%. In 1996,
U.S. shrimp imports were 720.9 million
pounds, and in 2005, imports were 1.5 bil-
lion pounds. With the exception of 2005,
imports have increased every year since 1996
(NOAA).
The increase in U.S. shrimp imports has
beensustainedbyincreases inUnitedStatesper
capita shrimp consumption. In 1980, per capita
shrimp consumption was only 1.4 pounds.
From 1990 to 1999, per capita consumption
averaged 2.3 pounds, and in per capita con-
sumption reached a record high of 4.2 in 2004.
In 2005, per capita consumption was
4.1 pounds (NOAA). The rise in per capita
consumption has made shrimp the top seafood
product among U.S. consumers every year
since 2001, surpassing can tuna and salmon,
where per capita consumption in 2005 was 3.1
and 2.4 pounds, respectively (Johnson).
Under U.S. trade law, the administration
of antidumping investigations is divided
between the USDOC and USITC, where the
USDOC determines whether imports subject
to investigation have been sold in the United
States at less than fair market value (Sharp
and Zantow) and the USITC determines
import injury to U.S. industries in antidump-
ing, countervailing duty, and global safeguard
investigations. If it is determined that export-
ers have injured U.S. producers, a counter-
vailing duty is imposed on imports deemed by
the USDOC as benefiting from subsidies
generated by a foreign government or by a
firm or person in that country (USITC). Based
on the USITC determination, the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce can issue a counter-
vailing duty, which is enforced by the U.S.
Customs Service. This is not necessarily
imposed on all U.S. imports from a given
country but on exporting companies as
determined by USDOC to have benefited
from different levels of government support
(USDOC).
In December 2003, an association of U.S.
shrimp farmers in eight southern states filed
an antidumping complaint with the USITC
against six countries that exported shrimp to
the United States.
1 The petitioned charged
that exports from Brazil, China, Ecuador,
India, Thailand, and Vietnam were dumped
onto the U.S. market causing material damage
to the domestic shrimp industry (Baughman;
Bhattarcharyya; Blauer). This was not the first
petition filed by the U.S. shrimp industry
claiming injury from imports. In 1971, the
National Shrimp Congress filled a petition
with the USITC for import relief. A petition
was also filed in 1984. In both instances the
USITC ruled that U.S. shrimp farmers were
not unfairly injured by shrimp imports (Diop,
Harrison, and Keithly).
In the most recent petition filed, the
primary points of contention were that the
six named countries accounted for 74% of all
shrimp imports and that imports from these
countries increased from 466 million pounds
in 2000 to 650 million pounds in 2002. They
also charged that import prices in the targeted
countries dropped 28% in the three years prior
to the petition and that U.S. dockside prices
fell from $6.08 to $3.30 per pound during that
same period. Lastly, petitioners charged that
higher tariff rates and sanitary requirements in
other large importing countries made the U.S.
market a dumping ground for shrimp exports
that were rejected in markets such as the
European Union (Bhattarcharyya).
In January 2005, the USITC ruled in favor
of the U.S. shrimp industry, indicating that
1The association of shrimp farmers in the South is
often referred to as the Southern Shrimp Alliance or
the Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee.
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industry was materially injured by shrimp
imports sold below market value. In a
unanimous decision the USITC ruled that
noncanned, mostly frozen shrimp and prawn
imports from all six countries had hurt or
threatened the U.S. shrimp industry (Long;
Zwanicki;). The USITC ruling led to the
imposition of antidumping duties where mar-
gins ranged from 0 to a high of 112.8%.T h e
trade weighted duties for each country were
36.91% for Brazil, 49.09% for China, 7.30%
for Ecuador, 14.20% for India, 6.39% for
Thailand, and 16.01% for Vietnam (Bhat-
tarcharyya).
Company-specific duties, highest and
lowest margins, and overall margins for
each exporter are presented in Table 1. Duties
were imposed on selected warm-water shrimp
and prawns, whether frozen, wild caught
(ocean harvested), or farm-raised (produced
by aquaculture); head-on or head-off; shell-on
or peeled; tail-on or tail-off; de-veined,
cooked, or raw; or otherwise processed in
frozen form. Frozen warm-water shrimp and
prawn products included in the scope of the
countervails, regardless of definitions in the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States (HTSUS), are products that are pro-
cessed from warm-water shrimp, frozen, and
sold in any count size (Fact sheet—Interna-
tional Trade Administration [ITA], Depart-
ment of Commerce).
Data
The data consist of U.S shrimp production
and prices and U.S. shrimp import data from
eight importing countries for sixteen 10-digit
HS codes. Six of these countries had anti-
dumping duties imposed. Mexico and the rest
of the world (ROW) had no antidumping
duties applied. Brazil, though one of the
countries levied with antidumping duties, was
included with the ROW for two reasons. First,
there were no reported imports from Brazil for
several months during the study period.
Second, its share of imports by the United
States was very small for the reported months.
Though the countervailing duties varied
among companies within the affected coun-
tries, data were not available for each com-
pany’s imports. As such, import data for each
of the Harmonized System (HS) codes was
aggregated to a monthly total for each country
and analysis of the countervailing duty impact
was based on the countrywide rate of duty,
rather than by company. Table 2 shows the
descriptive statistics on U.S. consumption of
shrimp by source country, 1995 to 2005.
The sixteen 10-digit HS codes could be
divided into three broad categories—frozen,
semiprocessed (brine, dry, and salted), and
processed (prepared frozen, breaded, and
canned). Frozen shrimp and prawn averaged
78% of all shrimp imported between 2000 and
2006, but for the period of study frozen shrimp













of China 82.27% 0.07% 112.81% 49.09
Vietnam 25.76% 4.30% 25.76% 16.01
Brazil 67.80% 4.97% 7.05% 36.91
Ecuador 4.42% 1.97% 3.58% 7.30
India 15.36% 2.48% 10.17% 14.20
Thailand 6.82% 5.29% 5.95% 6.39
Source: International Trade Administration (ITA), U.S. Department of Commerce.
a Bhattarcharyya, B. ‘‘The Indian Shrimp Industry Organizes to Fight the Threat of Anti-Dumping Action.’’ WTO, Managing
the Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Study—Case Study 17. Geneva, Switzerland. Internet site: 192.91.247.23/English/
res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case17_e.htm (Accessed 4/23/07).
612 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2008Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on U.S. Consumption of Shrimp by Source Country, January
1995 to December 2005
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Coefficient of Variation
Mexico
Quantity
(1,000 lbs) 5625.60 3757.45 102.35 21889.02 72.62
Price ($ per lb) 5.28 5.07 3.47 8.39 0.89
Value (000 USD) 29281.70 18507.95 719.36 128496.90 166.69
Ecuador
Quantity
(1,000 lbs) 7746.13 7295.02 2325.66 15317.67 58.85
Price ($ per lb) 3.62 3.76 2.42 5.06 0.79
Value (000 USD) 28408.95 25562.78 9656.13 65290.89 121.89
ROW
Quantity
(1,000 lbs) 19918.75 19091.97 9901.51 40769.04 83.32
Price ($ per lb) 3.71 3.74 2.38 4.90 0.76
Value (000 USD) 72270.86 67987.85 38310.74 142453.38 151.44
India
Quantity
(1,000 lbs) 5301.71 4566.01 1898.09 14704.80 51.20
Price ($ per lb) 3.40 3.43 1.97 5.02 0.80
Value (000 USD) 18845.51 15051.21 5239.31 55198.60 107.59
Thailand
Quantity
(1,000 lbs) 19702.97 17127.44 6895.14 51077.52 91.85
Price ($ per lb) 4.69 4.85 2.61 6.32 1.00
Value (000 USD) 88875.41 82859.08 21947.11 187709.96 183.64
Vietnam
Quantity
(1,000 lbs) 3824.06 1809.88 41.19 15544.94 64.41
Price ($ per lb) 5.65 5.46 2.66 8.84 1.04
Value (000 USD) 19612.53 11321.23 233.83 73955.82 139.39
China
Quantity
(1,000 lbs) 5349.73 2719.33 224.70 25336.39 79.82
Price ($ per lb) 2.46 2.37 1.48 4.50 0.72
Value (000 USD) 13599.92 7355.85 401.91 64532.35 126.51
United States
Quantity
(1,000 lbs) 28781.63 30417.46 3159.51 89502.92 129.78
Price ($ per lb) 1.78 1.81 0.87 2.78 0.64
Value (000 USD) 48542.91 51486.84 6900.40 202629.90 170.37
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much as 93% in 1990 to 71% in 2006 with most
of the decline occurring in peeled shrimp. The
frozen shrimp and prawn with shell-on of all
count size ranged from 70–75% of the total
frozenshrimp importedbetween2000 and2006
while peeled shrimp made up 25–30% of the
total frozen shrimp imported. Semiprocessed
shrimp, which consists of dry, salted, or brined
shrimp, made up 1% of shrimp imports in 2006
and has steadily declined from around 3% in
1990. Processed shrimp (prepared frozen,
breaded, and canned) has seen the largest
increase in the imports over the study period.
Monthly import quantities and expendi-
tures from each country were obtained from
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign
Agricultural Service, and Foreign Agricultural
Trade Statistics. All expenditures are on a free
on board (FOB) basis, excluding transporta-
tion costs, insurance and custom duties,
making import prices fairly representative of
the wholesale U.S. domestic price. Using
expenditures and quantities, per-unit values
($/lb) for each country were calculated.
Demand-Model structure
In this paper, the CBS demand system derived
by Keller and Van Driel is used to estimate
shrimp demand parameters. The CBS model
combines the nonlinear expenditure effects of
the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)
(Deaton and Muellbauer 1980b) and the price
effect of the Rotterdam model (Barton; Theil).
The Rotterdam model meets negativity con-
ditions on the Slutsky matrix required for a
downward sloping demand curve if its price
coefficients are negative, semidefinite. The
CBS demand system starts with a set of
partial-differential equations:
ð1Þ

















ln(.) is the natural–logarithm operator; qi and
pi are the quantity and price of the i
th good; x
is the total group expenditure; and wi is the
budget share for the i




The terms ci,j and bi are coefficients. In order
for the system of equations to be consistent
with optimization theory, the following re-











ð3Þ cij ~ cji, Vi, j
Equations (2) and (3) ensure that the CBS
model is homogenous of degree 0, consistent
with the budget constraint, and meets Slutsky
symmetry conditions. The matrix of compen-
sated price effects C 5 (ci,j) must also be
negative semidefinite (n.s.d), suggesting that
trace [C] # 0. The n.s.d condition implies that
own-price effects should be negative or at least
nonpositive. Given the constraints (2) and the
requirement that the own-price terms have to
be negative, some or all of the cross-price
terms should be positive.
Demand elasticities are derived from model
coefficients and the budget shares:
ð4Þ ei,j ~
ci, j { biwj { wiwj
wi
price elasticities ðÞ




The CBS demand system is based on consum-
er demand theory; however, we use wholesale
demand. Given the analytic parallel between
consumer demand and derived demand, use of
the CBS model in a derived demand context is
simply a matter of interpretation. The CBS
model, like other differential demand systems,
starts with a set of differential-in-logarithms
equations. The budget constraint in log-
differential form is expressed as:
ð6Þ qln x ðÞ ~
X
i




From Equation (6), we define the Divisia price









We rearrange Equation (6), and substitute in
Equations (7) and (8) to get the following:
ð9Þ
qln x ðÞ {
X
i
wiqln pi ðÞ ~
X
i
wiqln qi ðÞ ~ qln x ðÞ { qP ~ qQ
Equation (1) is re-specified as:






In aproductioncontext, theDivisiacan be thought
of as a measure of total shrimp or real shrimp
expenditures. Equation (10) implies that the
change in demand for a country’s shrimp is driven
by the changes in all countries’ prices and the
overall size of the industry. In a derived demand
context, bi is referred to as a scale coefficient
rather than an expenditure coefficient.
As typical of differential models, continu-
ous log are approximated with finite log
changes. Our specification also includes dy-
namic adjustment, seasonality, and taste or
technology shifts, following Anderson and
Blundell’s approach for adding dynamic
adjustments to demand systems. Their ap-
proach makes it relatively easy to recover the
long run or full-adjustment structure of
demand. We test various hypotheses about
dynamic adjustment in shrimp demand. The
most restricted model without dynamic ad-
justment is written as:
ð11Þ






z biDQt z ui,t
Equation (11) includes a random error term,
ui,t. The t subscript refers to the time in
months. The term ht is a time-varying weight.





ht   wi,t z 1 { ht ðÞ wi,t{1 ½ 




ht   wi,t z 1 { ht ðÞ wi,t{1 ½ 
  ln pi,t ðÞ { ln pi,t{1 ðÞ ½ 
ð14Þ ln xt ðÞ { ln xt{1 ðÞ ~ DQt z DPt
Here, the ‘‘differenced’’ budget constraint
becomes consistent with the differential bud-
get constraint. The more common approach in
this case is to fix the ht to K.
Because of the way it is constructed, the
endogenous variables of the CBS demand
system sum to 0 in every time period, which
makes the error terms sum to 0 as well. In
order to estimate the system, we have to drop
an equation. The estimates will be invariant to
the equation dropped; we happened to drop
the equation for U.S. shrimp.
One of the attractive features of the CBS
demand system is that it is linear in its
parameters. The equality restrictions of de-
mand theory are also linear in the parameters.
(The negative, semidefinite restrictions are
nonlinear inequalities.) We could specify
equation (11) in a more conventional, linear
regression format as:
ð15Þ
yi,t ~ ZtBi z ui,t
yi,t ~ ht   wi,t z 1 { ht ðÞ wi,t { 1 ðÞ
: Dln qi,t ðÞ { DQt ½ 
Zt ~ ...Dln pi,t ðÞ ,...,DQt ½ 
Bi ~ ...ci, j...bi
  
’
Our most general dynamic model includes
current and lagged (one period) endogenous
and exogenous and is written as:
ð16Þ
Dyi,t ~ DZtBi,sza tZt{1Bi,l{yi,t{1s
z ui,t
In Equation (16) the change in the endoge-
nous variable is related to the change in the
exogenous and the lagged exogenous and
endogenous variables. The vector Bi,s is the
short-run response to price and scale changes,
Bi,l is the long-run response and a is a positive
adjustment parameter. Both sets of B vectors
are required to be consistent with the imposed
Jones et al.: U.S. Demand for Source-Differentiated Shrimp 615equality and inequality restrictions. Equa-
tion (16) shows the most general adjustment
model. General lags are placed on the
exogenous variables while restricted lags are
placed on the endogenous variables. We also
experimented with restricted lags on the
exogenous variables, imposing the following
relationship between the two sets of ‘‘B’’
vectors:
ð17Þ Bi,s ~ c Bi,l
In Equation (17), c is a positive parameter. If
we make c equal to 1, then our ‘‘dynamic
adjustment’’ model is actually a model with
first-order autoregression, and the short-run
and long-run elasticities of demand are the
same.
CBS models are often estimated with an
intercept. The intercept is generally justified as
a taste-shift term; a non–0 intercept produces
demand changes unrelated to changes in
prices, expenditures, and/or scale. (In our
derived-demand case, an intercept could mea-
sure some combination of taste and technol-
ogy shifts.) We are using monthly data; we use
12 monthly dummies in each equation rather
than an intercept.
The monthly dummies’ coefficients must
also be consistent with the budget constraint;
this means that all the January coefficients
have to sum to 0, and all of February’s, and
so on. We looked at three different hypoth-
eses regarding the seasonal effects. It might
be the case that there is no seasonality in
derived shrimp demand. If so, we could have
used an intercept rather than a set of
monthly dummies. We compared models
with only an intercept to one with a full set
of dummies. As noted above, the monthly
dummies represent taste/technology shifters.
Shrimp demand might change month to
month, but still be stable on an annual
basis. If each shrimp source’s monthly
dummies sum to 0, (January plus February
. . . ) then demand is stable on a year-to-year
basis. We can combine the no-seasonality
and stable-annual-demand models by esti-
mating a model without either intercepts or
dummies.
Empirical Results and Discussion
Since the dynamic versions of the model are
nonlinear and the negativity conditions are
nonlinear, inequality restrictions, the model
was estimated using nonlinear maximum
likelihood estimation. Sixteen versions of the
model were estimated; each combination of
the four dynamic and the four monthly
dummy/intercept hypotheses. Table 3 shows
the hypothesis tests based on the likelihood
ratio test. Demand dynamics are consistent
with an autoregressive process; the autoregres-
sion is statistically significant. Shrimp demand
has a statistically significant seasonal pattern,
but is stable on an annual basis.
Estimated conditional price and share
demand coefficients are reported in Table 4.
For the most part, the compensated’’ demand
effects, the ‘‘Cij’’ coefficients, showed that
most of the cross-price ‘‘Cij’’ terms are
positive. Using these estimates and average
budget shares for the sample period, own- and
cross-price elasticities and scale/expenditure
elasticities were generated. These estimates are
presented in Table 5. The standard errors in
parenthesis were generated using 1,000 boot-
strap iterations. Green, Roke, and Hahn show
that the bootstrap covariances are more
accurate measures of the small sample covari-
ances than the more conventional approaches
(e.g., the Rao approach) that use asymptotic
approximations.
The conditional own-price elasticities rep-
resent both the substitution and the income
effect of price changes. These elasticities are
conditional on total expenditure on shrimp.
The own-price elasticities for all countries had
the expected negative signs and were statisti-
cally significant and inelastic (less than 21),
implying that it is possible for these countries
to increase revenue by lowering quantities
supplied. This also implies that an increase in
these countries’ shrimp prices would result in a
less than proportionate decrease in the quan-
tity of shrimp demanded from them by the
United States. The least inelastic was Thai-
land, 20.825. A 1% increase in the Thailand
shrimp price will result in a decrease in their
quantity of shrimp demanded by only 0.825%.
616 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2008The most inelastic was the ROW. A 1%
increase in the ROW shrimp price will result in
a decrease in their quantity of shrimp de-
manded by only 0.242%. The paucity of
studies on shrimp import demand limited the
ability to compare results.
The scale elasticity measures the degree by
which the amount of shrimp demanded from







No Shifts No Seasonal
Stable Annual with
Seasonal
General 84 77 7
No dynamics 28 2,268.693 2,270.028 2,749.954 2,752.360
AR1 27 2,271.390 2,272.907 2,770.152 2,773.415
Restricted X lag 26 2,298.909 2,300.283 2,772.682 2,775.888
General dynamics 2,346.030 2,347.434 2,808.042 2,811.237
Significance Levels of Test versus Most General Model, Based on Chi-Square
Dynamics
Dummy Constraint
No Shifts No Seasonal
Stable Annual with
Seasonal General
No dynamics 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.1%
Ar1 0.0% 0.0% 18.8% 8.1%
restricted X lag 0.0% 0.0% 23.3% 10.4%
general dynamics 0.0% 0.0% 86.6%
Significance Levels of Tests Comparing Stable Annual & AR1 Model with More General Models
Dynamics
Dummy Constraints
Stable Annual with Seasonal General
Ar1 86.0%
restricted X lag 11.2% 67.7%
general dynamics 8.0% 18.8%
Table 4. Estimated Price and Scale coefficients for the CBS Model, with Dynamic Adjustments
Replaced with AR1






Mexico 20.0273 0.0061 20.0091 20.0009 0.0127 0.0003 0.0027 0.0155 0.0433
Ecuador 0.0061 20.0470 0.0212 0.0031 0.0294 20.0077 20.0100 0.0049 20.0268
ROW 20.0091 0.0212 20.0405 0.0251 0.0035 0.0134 0.0028 20.0164 20.1633
India 20.0009 0.0031 0.0251 20.0291 0.0081 20.0108 0.0018 0.0026 0.0440
Thailand 0.0127 0.0294 0.0035 0.0081 20.1322 0.0119 0.0067 0.0598 0.0711
Vietnam 0.0003 20.0077 0.0134 20.0108 0.0119 20.0066 0.0009 20.0014 0.0339
China 0.0027 20.0100 0.0028 0.0018 0.0067 0.0009 20.0075 0.0026 0.0116
United
States 0.0155 0.0049 20.0164 0.0026 0.0598 20.0014 0.0026 20.0676 20.0137


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































618 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2008the United States and importing countries
change when U.S. overall shrimp demand
changes; this scale elasticity is also the
elasticity of total wholesale shrimp expendi-
ture. Scale elasticities for all countries were
positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level. The estimated scale elasticity for Mex-
ico, India, Thailand, Vietnam, and China were
greater than one. India had the largest scale
elasticity of demand of 1.740, which implies
that a 1% increase in overall U.S. shrimp
demand would increase Indian shrimp import
demand by 1.740%. Ecuador and the United
States had scale elasticities of less than 1,
though positive suggesting that a 1% increase
in total U.S. shrimp demand would result in a
less than 1% increase in shrimp demand from
these countries.
As noted above, the elasticities in Table 5
are conditional on total shrimp expenditure.
These cross-price elasticities account for both
the substitution effects and expenditure effects
of price changes. In a CBS specification, the
‘‘pure’’ substitution effects are determined by
Ci,j terms. Most of these cross-price terms are
positive. However, the cross-price elasticities
were very low, with 0.086 being the largest in
absolute value. For the most part, signs on the
cross elasticities were negative. This demon-
strates that the expenditure effects of price
declines tend to outweigh the pure substitution
effects. For example, China’s cross elasticity
were negative with all other countries. A few
cross elasticities were positive; for example, a
1% increase in the price of U.S. shrimp would
result in a statistically significant but small
increase in imports in shrimp from Thailand
of 0.031%.
Stability of Demand
The premise associated with the antidumping
procedure is that it has a measurable impact
on import behavior and that dumping margins
have a negative impact on dumped imports
with stronger reactions for larger margins. The
expectation, then, is that countervailing duties
will destabilize the demand for shrimp im-
ported from countries affected by the anti-
dumping duties. The results shown in Table 6
demonstrate that although a high degree of
monthly seasonality existed shrimp import
demand form all of the countries, the overall
demand was fairly stable.
Conclusions
The aim of the paper was threefold. First, we
empirically estimated the total U.S. demand
for shrimp and the conditional import demand
for shrimp consumed in the United States with
an econometric model. From this we calculat-
ed conditional import demand elasticities from
estimated demand parameters. Finally, we
tested for seasonality and stability of shrimp
import demand in the face of a countervailing
duty imposed on imports from certain coun-
tries.
The own-price elasticities for all countries
had the expected negative signs, were statisti-
cally significant, and inelastic. The scale
elasticities for all countries were positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level with
only the United States and Ecuador having
scale elasticities of less than 1. For the most
part, cross elasticities were negative, implying
that shrimp demand exhibited a complemen-
tary relationship between countries. In a few
cases, cross elasticities were positive, suggest-
ing a substitute relationship.
Our results from this study suggest that
despite the countervailing duties imposed by
the United States on six major shrimp
exporting countries, shrimp demand from
these countries was fairly stable although
there was a high degree of monthly sea-
sonality. The monthly seasonality was
expected since production for most countries
is seasonal.
[Received May 2007; Accepted December 2007.]
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